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MYANMAR’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: OPPORTUNITY
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE TO ADDRESS THE
PERSECUTION OF THE ROHINGYA
INTRODUCTION
Myanmar1 elected the National League for Democracy into power in
November 2015,2 ushering in its first democratically elected government since
1962.3 The much-awaited political change produced an end to years of
economic sanctions;4 the development of new international relations,
particularly with the United States;5 and the hope that the former regime’s
human rights abuses will be adequately addressed and alleviated.6 Yet, the
Rohingya, a stateless Muslim ethnic group residing in Rakhine State in western
Myanmar7 and considered the world’s most persecuted ethnic minority,8
continue to face violence that human rights groups say amounts to ethnic
cleansing9 and crimes against humanity.10 The Rohingya that have not been
1
This Comment uses Myanmar because it is what the country’s government officially uses. In 1989,
the ruling military junta changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar. Despite the official
change, people within the country and abroad tend to use both names, sometimes choosing one over the other
for political reasons. Should You Say Myanmar or Burma?, ECONOMIST (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/12/economist-explains-19. For example, the U.S.
State Department has long used Burma “out of support for the democratic opposition” and continues to use it
on its website. Mark Memmott, Why Burma? Why Myanmar? Why Both?, NPR (Dec. 2, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/12/02/143049567/why-burma-why-myanmar-why-both;
see
also U.S. Relations with Burma, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.
htm.
2
Marina Koren, A Historic Day in Burma, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2016/02/burma-myanmar-parliament-session/458739/.
3
Id.
4
Julie Hirschfield Davis, Obama Pledges to Lift All Sanctions Against Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/world/asia/myanmar-obama.html.
5
Grace Aranow, President Obama and Aung San Suu Kyi Celebrate Progress in Burma, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/09/15/president-obama-and-daw-aung-sansuu-kyi-celebrate-burmese-progress.
6
Stéphanie Giry, For Myanmar’s Leader, More Power, but More Expectations, Too, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/asia/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-sanctions.html.
7
Anealla Safdar, Who Are the Rohingya?, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2015/10/rohingya-151024202611276.html.
8
The Rohingyas: The Most Persecuted People on Earth?, ECONOMIST (June 13, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21654124-myanmars-muslim-minority-have-been-attacked-impunitystripped-vote-and-driven; see also Who Are the Rohingya and What Is Happening in Myanmar?, AMNESTY
INT’L (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org.au/who-are-the-rohingya-refugees/.
9
Megan Specia, The Rohingya in Myanmar: How Years of Strife Grew into a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-muslim.html.
10
AMNESTY INT’L, “MY WORLD IS FINISHED” - ROHINGYA TARGETED IN CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
IN MYANMAR 6 (2017), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Amnesty-My-World-IsFinished-Myanmar-18.10.20171.pdf [hereinafter MY WORLD IS FINISHED].
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forced to flee and remain in Myanmar continue to face discrimination and
human rights violations, including, but not limited to, the continuous
deprivation of citizenship, severe restrictions on their movement, limited
access to life-saving health care, and denial of education and equal
employment opportunities.11
Aung San Suu Kyi, a member of the National League for Democracy and
the de facto leader of Myanmar,12 has been at the forefront of the international
attention given to the Rohingya. One of her early actions as State Counsellor—
a request to the U.S. ambassador to Myanmar not to use the term “Rohingya”
to describe the persecuted Muslim community—aligned with the military
regime’s refusal to acknowledge the term of identification and drew criticism
from within the Rohingya community and abroad.13 Furthermore, violence has
continued to plague the Rohingya notwithstanding Aung San Suu Kyi’s new
leadership. In late August 2017, the Myanmar military launched an attack on
the Rohingya population as a whole in northern Rakhine State, in response to
an attack by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on thirty security force
outposts.14 The military “killed at least hundreds of Rohingya men, women,
and children, raped and perpetrated other forms of sexual violence on
Rohingya women and girls, and carried out organized and targeted burning of
entire Rohingya villages.”15 As a result of the violence, over half a million
refugees fled into neighboring Bangladesh over the course of only eight
weeks.16
Long considered a widely respected international human rights icon, Aung
San Suu Kyi’s response—or lack thereof—to the Rohingya crisis has
dramatically tarnished her reputation.17 World leaders and human rights
11
AMNESTY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT: MYANMAR 2015/2016, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/AI2016-02-23-AP-Myanmar.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
12
Profile: Aung San Suu Kyi, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific11685977. Aung San Suu Kyi’s official title is State Counsellor, a position the National League for
Democracy (NLD) specifically created for her to counteract a provision in Myanmar’s Constitution that bars
those whose children have foreign citizenship from becoming president. Liam Cochrane, Aung Saan Suu Kyi
to Become ‘State Counsellor’ of Myanmar, ABC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-0405/aung-san-suu-kyi-to-become-state-counsellor/7301994.
13
Richard C. Paddock, Aung San Suu Kyi Asks U.S. Not to Refer to ‘Rohingya’, N.Y. TIMES (May 6,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-aung-san-suu-kyi.html.
14
MY WORLD IS FINISHED, supra note 10, at 6.
15
Id.
16
Feliz Solomon, The Rohingya Exodus Surges Again, with 20,000 More Arriving at the Bangladesh
Border, TIME (Oct. 17, 2017), http://time.com/4985453/bangladesh-myanmar-rohingya-refugees/.
17
Critics Circle Aung San Suu Kyi Over Rohingya Crisis, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 10, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/critics-circle-aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-crisis170910090032580.html.
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advocates have criticized her inaction and refusal to condemn the state security
forces’ human rights abuses against the Rohingya.18
Despite the unpromising and violent start, Myanmar’s democratization
may provide an opportunity for substantial progress towards a solution to the
Rohingya’s statelessness and violent persecution. Much of the discourse
surrounding the plight of the Rohingya has pointed to the role the former
autocratic regime played in their diminished status, particularly since that
regime passed the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law, which continues to
bar the Rohingya from obtaining citizenship.19 According to the United
Nations, “democracy provides the natural environment for the protection and
effective realization of human rights.”20 Indeed, international observers have
noted the link between the promotion of human rights and Aung San Suu Kyi
and the National League for Democracy’s new political leadership, with the
Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the situation of human
rights in Myanmar emphasizing that “the consolidation of democracy and the
creation of a culture of respect for human rights is a complex undertaking
requiring political will.”21
Although the situation with the Rohingya in Myanmar implicates a
multitude of international laws and principles,22 the crux of the issue is the
refusal of Myanmar’s government and society to recognize the Rohingya’s
history and identity. This refusal has contributed to the statelessness of the
Rohingya.23 The conferral of citizenship upon the Rohingya, through either the
amendment or repeal of the 1982 Citizenship Law, is often advocated as a
solution to the humanitarian crisis they face.24 While citizenship may be the
ultimate aim, it is not a realistic proximate aim, given the stubborn stance on
the Rohingya’s identity and status within Myanmar despite the recent
18

Id.
See, e.g., IRISH CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA: THE
SITUATION OF THE ROHINGYAS 26, 41, 93, 98 (2010), http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/uploads/9/1/8/4/
9184764/rohingya_report_2010 [hereinafter CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA].
20
Democracy and Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS: GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.un.org/en/sections/
issues-depth/democracy/#DH (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
21
Yanghee Lee (Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar), Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, U.N. DOC A/71/361 (Aug. 29, 2016).
22
For an overview of some of the international legal issues the Rohingya crisis implicates, see
generally, AMNESTY INT’L, MYANMAR 2016/2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/
myanmar/report-myanmar/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
23
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 93.
24
See Susan Cunningham, Do Myanmar’s Rohingya Really Need Citizenship Now?, FORBES (July 4,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/susancunningham/2015/07/04/do-myanmars-rohingya-really-needcitizenship-now/#55cbfc68681c.
19

HOQUE GALLEYPROOFS

554

5/15/2018 12:37 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

democratic transition.25 Further, citizenship may prove to be an insufficient
solution that provides rights in name only.26 Myanmar’s democratic transition
provides an opportunity for the implementation of transitional justice to
address the underlying attitudes concerning the Rohingya, which have played a
major role in their plight.27 A truth commission and institutional reform, both
models of transitional justice, are more realistic proximate aims to combat the
systemic violence and human rights violations the Rohingya continue to
suffer.28
Part I of this Comment presents a background of the Rohingya. First, it
overviews the other Muslim groups present in western Myanmar. Then it looks
at the history of the Rohingya, surveying their initial arrival in Rakhine State,
their mass immigration into the region during British colonial rule, their
experiences under the military junta following Myanmar’s independence, and
their current plight. Part I also discusses the stateless position of the Rohingya
and the systemic discrimination it has produced, primarily through
examination of the 1982 Citizenship Law. Next, Part II analyzes whether an
amendment to the 1982 Citizenship Law—as is advocated by many in the
international community—is a likely and sufficient solution to the statelessness
of the Rohingya. Finally, Part III discusses the possibility and mechanics of the
implementation of a truth commission and institutional reform as potential
remedies to the humanitarian crisis the Rohingya face.
I.

THE POSITION OF THE ROHINGYA IN MYANMAR

A. Overview of Muslim Groups in Myanmar
It is important to distinguish between the various groups of Muslims in
Rakhine State before delving into the historical background of the Rohingya—
one such Muslim group. According to the most recent available census
conducted by the Myanmar government in 2014, 87.9% of Myanmar’s
population is Buddhist and 4.3% is Muslim.29 However, the census did not
include the Rohingya population, so the actual percentage of Muslims in
25
See, e.g., David Scott Mathieson, The Lady and the Rohingya, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/opinion/the-rohingya-the-ladys-problem-from-hell.html.
26
See infra Part II(B).
27
Aileen Thomson, Prospects for Justice in Myanmar: Does New Political Reality Offer Opportunities
for Addressing Violations?, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.ictj.org/
publication/myanmar-justice-prospects-nld.
28
See infra Part III.
29
The World Factbook: Burma, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
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Myanmar is considered to be higher—estimated at around 4.61%.30 This
translates to 2.35 million Muslims out of a total population of 51 million.31
The oldest Muslim group in Myanmar is now known as the Burmese
Muslims, although they used to be referred to as “Pathi” or “Zerbadee.”32
Burmese Muslims can trace their origins back to the eighth century, but most
look to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when their ancestors arrived in
Myanmar as traders, court servants, or mercenaries.33 Burmese Muslims are
linguistically and culturally integrated into Burmese society.34 The Kaman is a
separate Muslim group that lives mostly in southern Rakhine State.35 The
Kaman are descendants of Muslims who immigrated from the Mughal Empire
to Arakan in the seventeenth century.36
The largest Muslim community in Myanmar is the Rohingya.37 Most live
in Rakhine State, but there is a sizeable population in what was once known as
Rangoon, now Yangon, the former capital.38 Broadly speaking, they are
ethnically South Asian and speak a dialect of Bengali.39 “Rohingya” is a
controversial term of reference, partly due to the dispute over the history of the
group’s presence in Myanmar.40
B. Historical Background of the Rohingya
1. Colonial Period
Muslim settlers in western Myanmar, most of whom were seafarers and
traders from the Middle East, first arrived as early as the eighth century in what
was then the independent kingdom of Arakan, now called Rakhine State.41
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Arakanese launched
30
Kyaw Ye Lynn, Census Data Shows Myanmar Muslim Population Has Fallen, ANDALOU AGENCY
(July 21, 2016), http://aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/census-data-shows-myanmar-muslim-population-has-fallen/
612764.
31
Id.
32
Andrew Selth, Burma’s Muslims: A Primer, LOWY INST.: THE INTERPRETER (Mar. 27, 2013),
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/burmas-muslims-primer. See generally MOSHE YEGAR, THE
MUSLIMS OF BURMA: A STUDY OF A MINORITY GROUP (1972).
33
Selth, supra note 32.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See YEGAR, supra note 32, at 24.
37
Selth, supra note 32.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
The Rohingyas: The Most Persecuted People on Earth?, supra note 8.
41
Id. These Muslims are now referred to as Burmese Muslims. See Selth, supra note 32.
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regular raids into neighboring Bengal and forcibly settled Bengali Muslim
captives in Arakan, either selling them as slaves or coercing them to serve as
soldiers in the king’s army.42 The term “Rohingya” first appeared around then,
translating to “inhabitant of Rohang,” which was the early Muslim name for
Arakan.43
In 1785, the Burmese army conquered the kingdom of Arakan.44 In 1825,
the British took control of Burma, and hundreds of thousands of Muslim
Bengalis, or “Chittagonians,” as the British called them, traveled from Bengal
to Arakan from 1825 until 1942.45 In fact, by 1941, about a third of the
population of Sittwe, the current capital city of Rakhine State, was recorded as
coming from Chittagong or elsewhere in Bengal.46 There was little tension
between the Muslims and Arakanese up until this arrival of Muslims from
Bengal, orchestrated and facilitated by the British.47 The mass immigration of
Muslims to Arakan changed things.48 Although it boosted the colonial
economy, local Arakanese bitterly resented the mass immigration because they
believed their jobs and land were being taken over by people who are still
referred to as “illegal immigrants” or just “Bengalis.”49
The hostility between the Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Arakanese
worsened during and after World War II.50 The British armed some Muslims in
the region to fight against the Arakanese, who largely sided with the
Japanese.51 The hostility continued when, in 1947, the Rohingya formed an
army and approached President Muhammad Ali Jinnah of the newly
established Pakistan to ask him to incorporate northern Arakan, where the
majority of the Rohingya lived, into East Pakistan (which is now
Bangladesh).52 Their plea was rejected, and northern Rakhine State remained a

42

The Rohingyas: The Most Persecuted People on Earth?, supra note 8.
Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MYANMAR COUNTRY REPORT: INFORMATION ON ROHINGYA
REFUGEES IN BURMA (2003), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/13/MMR00001.
pdf [hereinafter MYANMAR COUNTRY REPORT].
44
The Rohingyas: The Most Persecuted People on Earth?, supra note 8.
45
Id. “Chittagonians” refers to those who are from Chittagong, a region in southeastern Bangladesh
bordering Myanmar. See generally Bangladesh, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/bg/ (last
visited Feb. 16, 2018).
46
The Rohingyas: The Most Persecuted People on Earth?, supra note 8.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
MYANMAR COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 43. Many observers speculate the Buddhists in Rakhine
State viewed the Rohingya’s request to secede as a disloyal action that has, in part, led to the discrimination
43
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part of Burma, which gained independence from the United Kingdom in
1948.53
2. Rohingya – A Disputed Term of Reference
The Rohingya community’s loyalty to the British during the war, and its
desire for an independent state culminating in a Mujihid movement, formed the
basis of the frequent claims that the Rohingya are simply foreigners, or “Kala,”
intent on seceding from the Union of Burma.54 In fact, the ethnic majority in
western Myanmar for whom the region is currently named after, the Rakhine,55
fundamentally reject any suggestion that the Rohingya should be considered an
ethnic group with bona fide historical roots in the region.56 Instead, they
contend that the word “Rohingya” arose in the 1950s during the time of the
Mujihid movement.57 The Rohingya also do not have support from the other
Muslims residing in Rakhine State.58
Despite the state’s pervasive rejection of Rohingya history, a basis of
justification for state-sanctioned discrimination against the Rohingya to this
day, historians have found the term “Rohingya” documented in the region prior
to the British Raj.59 For example, “a 1799 study of languages spoken in the
Burmese area divided the natives of Arakan state between ‘Yakain’ and
‘Rooinga.’”60 Also, “the Classical Journal of 1811 distinguishes between the
Rohingya and Rakhine as the main ethnic groups in the region.”61 Furthermore,
a German compendium of languages of the wider region mentions the
existence of the Rohingya as an ethnic group and separate language in 1815.62

they face in the present day. See MARTIN SMITH, BURMA INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 96
(2d. ed. 1993).
53
The Rohingyas: The Most Persecuted People on Earth?, supra note 8.
54
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 25.
55
The 1974 Burma Constitution granted Arakan statehood within the Union of Burma, and in a
conscious policy decision, Arakan was given the official title of Rakhine State, reflecting the Rakhine
majority. Id. at 91.
56
Id. at 21.
57
Id.
58
Id. For a review of Muslim groups in Rakhine State, see supra Part I(A).
59
Azeem Ibrahim, War of Words: What’s in the Name “Rohingya”?, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (June 16,
2016), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/war-words-whats-name-rohingya.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
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3. Following Myanmar’s Independence
Despite the history behind the Rohingya’s presence in Myanmar, they have
faced significant discrimination and repression based on claims that they are
“illegal” since the former military regime came into power following a coup
d’état in 1962. In February 1978, Myanmar’s leader General Ne Win instituted
the “Nagamin,” or “King Dragon,” campaign.63 The campaign’s stated
objective was to “scrutinize each individual living in the State, designating
citizens and foreigners in accordance with the law and taking actions against
foreigners who have filtered into the country illegally.”64 This may have been
motivated by the influx of Bengali refugees into Rakhine State during and
following the civil war, or War for Liberation, in Bangladesh during 1971.65
Although the stated objective of the operation indicated it was intended as a
proper survey of the residents of Myanmar,66 in reality the Myanmar army
committed widespread killings and rapes of Rohingya civilians, and they
carried out the destruction of mosques and other acts of religious persecution.67
These events resulted in the exodus of an estimated 200,000 Rohingya to
neighboring Bangladesh.68
In response to the exodus, the Myanmar government asserted that those
who fled were “illegal Bengali immigrants who had crossed into Burma as part
of a general expansion in the Bengali population in this region,” while also
blaming the extreme violence of the military campaign on the Rohingya,
referring to them as “Bengalis” and “Muslims.”69 Despite their convictions
about those who had fled, the Myanmar government engaged in bilateral
negotiations with Bangladesh and agreed to repatriate close to 190,000
refugees to Rakhine State.70 During the negotiations, the Bangladeshi
authorities complained of the economic and social burden the presence of the
Rohingya placed on the local community where they had settled.71 The United
63
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 91. General Ne Win was the
leader of the military coup that ousted Myanmar’s democratically elected government following its
independence from Britain, establishing a one-party, military-led state. See Myanmar Profile – Timeline, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12992883.
64
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 25.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 92; see also Benjamin Zawacki, Defining Myanmar’s “Rohingya Problem”, 20 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 18, 18 (2012).
68
Zawacki, supra note 67, at 18.
69
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 92.
70
Id.
71
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BURMESE REFUGEES IN BANGLADESH: STILL NO DURABLE
SOLUTION (May 2000), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/index.htm.
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Nations also played a role in the repatriation program, suggesting that a flow of
aid would be more readily accessible if the Myanmar government accepted the
repatriation program.72 Initially, few refugees opted for repatriation but more
did once the Bangladeshi government allowed camp conditions to deteriorate
and restricted food rations.73
Soon after, the Myanmar military passed the 1982 Citizenship Law, which
did not recognize the Rohingya as one of Myanmar’s over 130 official ethnic
groups, officially rendering the ethnic minority stateless.74 In 1992, there was
another massive exodus of Rohingya to Bangladesh, with 260,000 Rohingya
living in refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.75 Although there was no
official military campaign like there was in 1978, the Myanmar government’s
policies nonetheless left large portions of the Rohingya with no option but to
flee.76 These policies included the “Four Cuts” policy: a militarized effort to
undermine the capacity of ethnic armed opposition/independence groups.77
Another policy was the construction of “model villages,” which involved
confiscating land and transferring individuals and families from urban areas
(primarily in central Myanmar) to border regions like Rakhine State.78 Model
villages were newly constructed towns that were intended to diversify and
develop remote border areas.79 However, in the development and construction
of these villages, the Rohingya faced gross exaction of forced labor, arbitrary
land confiscations, and restrictions on freedom of movement.80 Further, the
Myanmar military’s actions—including raping and murdering women, forcing
men into press gangs, and destroying mosques and schools—led more than
45,000 Rohingya and other Muslims to flee to Bangladesh in just one month in
1992.81

72

Id.
Id.
74
The Rohingyas: The Most Persecuted People on Earth?, supra note 8. The stateless status of the
Rohingya is discussed infra Part I(D).
75
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 88, 93.
76
Id. at 91–92.
77
The “Four Cuts” policy was originally drawn up by General Ne Win in the mid-1960s. Id. at 88.
78
Id. at 93.
79
Id. Each model village is planned to accommodate 100 families, with each family being allocated a
three-acre plot of land. Id. at 100.
80
Id. at 100–01, 105.
81
Edward A. Gargan, Even Bleak Bangladesh Is a Haven to Muslims Fleeing the Burmese Army, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 7, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/07/world/even-bleak-bangladesh-is-a-haven-tomuslims-fleeing-the-burmese-arm.html?pagewanted=all.
73
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Similar to the events of 1978, there was another repatriation program,
though it was marred with problems.82 While the Bangladeshi government had
initially sheltered the refugees in camps in the vicinity of Cox’s Bazar in
southeastern Bangladesh, it soon after announced it would not support local
integration due to economic and social strains.83 Accordingly, the governments
of Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) in 1992, with Myanmar agreeing to accept the return of all refugees
who could establish a “bona fide residence” in Myanmar84 and that the
repatriation would be safe and voluntary.85 However, the Bangladeshi
government used force against, withheld rations from, imprisoned, and often
beat or threatened to beat refugees who did not agree to return.86 By 1993,
when both countries signed an agreement with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nearly 50,000 refugees had been
forcibly repatriated.87
4. Recent Plight of the Rohingya
The Rohingya continue to face discrimination and violence, leading to
smaller numbers finding refuge in various countries—including Malaysia and
Indonesia—every year.88 The other Muslims in Rakhine State who do not
identify as Rohingya have also faced discrimination and violence in recent
years. In 2001, there was communal violence between the general Muslim and
Buddhist populations in Sittwe and Taungoo.89 In Taungoo, 200 Muslims were
killed, and multiple mosques and hundreds of buses were destroyed in a riot.90
Buddhist monks, fueled by the recent destruction of Buddhist images in
Bamiyan, Afghanistan, and the attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United
States, had widely distributed inflammatory anti-Muslim pamphlets inciting
hatred.91

82

MYANMAR COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 43.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 71.
84
C.R. Abrar, Repatriation of Rohingya Refugees, Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit
(1996), http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/Abrar-repatriation.htm [http://web.archive.org/web/201710101405
49/http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/Abrar-repatriation.htm].
85
MYANMAR COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 43.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 19, at 27; MY WORLD IS FINISHED, supra note 10, at 101.
89
Amrutha Gayathri, Buddhist Mob Beats 10 Muslims to Death In Myanmar; Communal Violence
Spreads, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 5, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/buddhist-mob-beats-10-muslims-deathmyanmar-communal-violence-spreads-701466.
90
Id.
91
Id. The anti-Muslim pamphlets were targeted at the Muslim minority in general. Id.
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In 2012, following the rape and murder of an Arakanese woman by three
Rohingya Muslim men, there were further concerns of a wider religious
conflict between Buddhists and the general Muslim minority in Rakhine
State.92 Hundreds of Arakanese Buddhists surrounded a bus carrying Muslim
pilgrims, forced ten men off, and beat them to death.93 These events caused
riots to break out in a few townships in Rakhine State, leaving hundreds dead
and damaging or destroying large amounts of property, including homes,
mosques, and monasteries.94 In addition to the Rohingya, Kaman Muslims also
were targeted.95 Around 120,000 people were displaced within Rakhine
State.96 Although Kaman Muslims were included in this population, the vast
majority was Rohingya.97 Then-President of Myanmar Thein Sein responded
to the violent events and displacement by reiterating Myanmar’s position on
the Rohingya: they do not belong here.98 He said:
We will take care of our own ethnic nationalities, but Rohingyas who
came to Myanmar illegally are not of our ethnic nationalities and we
cannot accept them here. The solution to this problem is that they can
be settled in refugee camps managed by UNHCR, and UNHCR
provides for them. If there are countries that would accept them, they
could be sent there.99

In addition to the violence committed by the Buddhist population in
Rakhine State, the Rohingya continue to face state-sanctioned violence from
Myanmar’s military, who often justify their actions as responses to attacks by
the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army,
formerly known as Harakah al-Yaqin,100 is a Rohingya militant group financed
by Rohingya émigrés in Saudi Arabia.101 In October 2016, Myanmar’s military
92
Daniel Schearf, Kaman Muslims Raise Concerns of Wider Conflict, VOA NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.voanews.com/a/burmas-kaman-muslims-cite-religious-ethnic-conflict-in-rakhine-state/1555524.
html.
93
Karen Pimentel Simbulan, A Legal and Structural Analysis of the Violence in Rakhine State Against
the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar, ACADEMIA http://www.academia.edu/6101564/Legal_and_Structural_
Analysis_of_Violence_in_Rakhine_State_against_the_Rohingya_Muslims_of_Myanmar (last visited Feb. 16,
2018).
94
Id.
95
Schearf, supra note 92.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Simbulan, supra note 93.
99
Id.
100
Myanmar: Who Are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41160679.
101
See Int’l Crisis Grp., Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State, CRISIS GROUP (Dec. 15,
2016),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgencyrakhine-state.
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initiated a four-month crackdown in the region after unknown assailants,
believed to be Rohingya, killed police officers near the border with
Bangladesh.102 Initially, there were reports that the lockdown confined many
Rohingya to their homes, cutting off access to international relief agencies and
making them more vulnerable to violence.103
The military maintained that their actions are part of a counter-insurgency
campaign in response to the attack.104 But, while the Myanmar military
initially went house to house seeking adult men, they proceeded to rape women
and burn homes.105 In fact, according to a U.N. report, members of Myanmar’s
Army and the police have killed hundreds of men, women, and children; gangraped women and girls; and forced as many as 90,000 Rohingya to flee from
their homes.106 Despite hundreds of reports to the contrary,107 Myanmar
government officials said Rohingya forces set fire to their own houses and
denied most charges of human rights abuses, with the exception of a policesanctioned beating of a few dozen kneeling men that was captured on video.108
Similar violence occurred in August and September 2017, after the Arakan
Rohingya Salvation Army attacked thirty police outposts and an army base,
killing twelve state officials.109 In response, the Myanmar military carried out a
scorched-earth campaign, burning down entire Rohingya villages and shooting
people as they tried to flee, all under the guise of “clearance operations” to find
militants.110 These operations were marked by widespread and systematic
human rights violations, including unlawful killings, sexual violence, torture,

102
Nick Cumming-Bruce, Rohingya Face ‘Campaign of Terror’ in Myanmar, U.N. Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-un-report.html?_r=0.
103
Mike Ives, Calls Grow for Access to Western Myanmar in Face of Military Lockdown, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-rakhine-state.html.
104
Ellen Barry, ‘There Are No Homes Left’: Rohingya Tell of Rape, Fire and Death in Myanmar, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/world/asia/rohingya-violence-myanmar.html.
105
Id.
106
Cumming-Bruce, supra note 102.
107
See Barry, supra note 104. Barry’s article includes excerpts from interviews with Rohingya men and
women who fled the violence in their villages and are now living in refugee camps. One woman, Mumtaz
Begum, recounts how she and her daughter were beaten with bamboo clubs, her 10-year-old son was shot
through the leg, her husband was killed, and her daughter was gang-raped by soldiers the following day. Id.
108
Id.; see also Mike Ives, Myanmar Holds Officers After Video Purports to Show Police Beating
Rohingya, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/03/world/asia/myanmar-videopolice-brutality.html.
109
MY WORLD IS FINISHED, supra note 10, at 6.
110
Scorched Earth Campaign in Rakhine, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2017/09/myanmar-scorched-earth-tactics-rakhine-report-170914152129789.html.
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enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests.111 The massive scale of the
violence seemed to be designed to push the Rohingya population in northern
Rakhine State out of the country and make it very hard for them to return.112
As of October 2016, over 520,000 Rohingya have fled into Bangladesh, where
they live in deplorable camps with very limited access to food, clean water,
and health care.113
C. Systemic Discrimination Against the Rohingya
The violence targeted at the Rohingya for over thirty years can partly be
attributed to a political, social, and economic system—manifested in law,
policy, and practice—designed to discriminate against the Rohingya.114
One of the main sources of that political, social, and economic system is
the refusal of the Burmese regime to acknowledge and grant Burmese
citizenship for the Rohingya.115 Although the refusal continues into the present
day, this was not always the case.116 The Rohingya had a definite scope for
citizenship under the 1947 Constitution, which permitted those born and living
in any of the territories of the former British regime for at least eight years
during 1932–1942—and with the intention to remain there permanently—to
obtain citizenship.117 However, this was then supplemented by the 1948 Union
Citizenship Act, in which the Burmese government excluded the Rohingya
from their list of indigenous races in Burma.118
The 1948 Union Citizenship Law was replaced by the 1982 Citizenship
Law, which effectively denies the right to a nationality to the Rohingya
population in both design and implementation.119 The 1982 Citizenship Law
was promulgated in the immediate aftermath of the fallout of the Nagamin
111
MY WORLD IS FINISHED, supra note 10, at 6. Survivors’ accounts of the violence in Rakhine describe
unimaginable horror: “Government soldiers stabbing babies, cutting off boys’ heads, gang-raping girls,
shooting 40-millimeter grenades into houses, burning entire families to death, and rounding up dozens of
unarmed male villagers and summarily executing them.” See Jeffrey Gettleman, Rohingya Recount Atrocities:
‘They Threw My Baby Into a Fire’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/
world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-atrocities.html.
112
MY WORLD IS FINISHED, supra note 10, at 6.
113
More Than 300,000 Rohingya Refugee Children ‘Outcast and Desperate,’ UNICEF Says, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/20/300000-rohingya-refugeechildren-outcast-and-desperate-says-unicef.
114
Zawacki, supra note 67, at 18.
115
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 95.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Zawacki, supra note 67, at 18.
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campaign.120 Human rights advocates have suggested the law was deliberately
targeted at the Rohingya, while also discriminating against other immigrants
who had entered the country during the British colonial period.121
Like the 1948 Union Citizenship Law, the 1982 Citizenship Law also lists
specific groups that are considered “nationals” and considers members of any
other ethnic group Burmese citizens if they “have settled in any of the
territories included within the State as their permanent home from a period
anterior to 1185 B.E., 1823 A.D.”122 Although the law recognizes more than
130 national ethnic groups, it does not recognize the Rohingya.123 One major
difference between the 1948 Union Citizenship Law and the 1982 Citizenship
Law is that the latter creates three classes of citizens—full, associate, and
naturalized.124
Full citizenship is “granted to nationals such as the Kachin, Kayah, Karen,
Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan and ethnic groups as have settled in any
of the territories included within the State as their permanent home from a
period anterior to 1185 B.E., 1823 A.D.”125 The exclusion of the Rohingya
from the list of recognized national races means that unless the Council of
State alters the list, the Rohingya cannot become full citizens.126 Alternatively,
associate citizenship is “granted under certain conditions, to persons who
applied for citizenship under the 1948 law and their children, and whose
application was ongoing at the time of promulgation.”127 The majority of
Rohingya cannot claim associate citizenship because the 1982 Citizenship Law
limited associate citizenship to applications that were lodged within one year
of the law’s coming into force.128 Lastly, naturalized citizenship “may be
granted to non-nationals such as members of ethnic groups not recognized as

120
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 95. For a brief overview of the
Nagamin campaign, see supra Part I(B)(3).
121
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 95.
122
Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4 of 1982.
123
Zawacki, supra note 67, at 18. This remains the official position today. U Nyi Nyi, the Program
Manager of the UNHCR Immigration and National Registration Project and former director of the Attorney
General’s Office, wrote, “It is legally indisputable that the Rohingya are not and have never been a Myanmar
ethnic group. For many years, however, Muslims have invaded illegally into northern Rakhine State.” U Nyi
Nyi, The Case Against Rohingya Citizenship, MYAN. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.mmtimes.com/index.
php/opinion/9519-why-the-government-is-right-to-deny-rohingya-citizenship.html.
124
Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4 of 1982.
125
Id.
126
AMNESTY INT’L, MYANMAR: THE ROHINGYA MINORITY: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DENIED 26 (2004),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA16/005/2004/en/.
127
Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4 of 1982.
128
MYANMAR: THE ROHINGYA MINORITY: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DENIED, supra note 126.
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indigenous races,”129 which include the Rohingya. Despite the availability of
this pathway, very few Rohingya have access to the required documentary
evidence of ancestral or parental residency.130 Moreover, applicants for
naturalization must be able to speak one of the national languages well.131 The
Rohingya speak their own dialect, which is not recognized as a national
language.132 Further, the Rohingya have restricted access to education through
which additional language skills could be obtained.133
Even Rohingya children who are born in Myanmar cannot hold
citizenship.134 In order for a child to attain Burmese citizenship, at least one
parent must already hold one of the three types of Burmese citizenship, which
is rare for the Rohingya.135 A child can attempt to become a naturalized citizen
once he or she becomes eighteen years old but would face the same obstacles
as adults in meeting the other requirements—namely, the national language
requirement.136 Therefore, the vast majority of Rohingya do not fall under any
class of citizenship of the 1982 Citizenship Law.
D. Stateless Status of the Rohingya Within Myanmar
As a result of the 1982 Citizenship Law, many Rohingya have been
rendered stateless.137 According to the UNHCR, the international legal
definition of a stateless person is, “a person who is not considered as a national
by any State under the operation of its law.”138 The right to a nationality is
considered essential to the realization of other fundamental human rights and
has been described as the “right to have rights.”139 However, holding a
nationality is not a prerequisite to enjoying human rights.140 Being human is
the sole requirement entitling one to human rights, and the status of one’s
129

Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4 of 1982.
MYANMAR: THE ROHINGYA MINORITY: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DENIED, supra note 126.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 71.
135
Id.
136
Crimes Against Humanity in Western Burma, supra note 19, at 96.
137
Id.
138
Ending Statelessness, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/stateless-people.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2018). The definition comes from the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and has
subsequently become a part of customary international law. See Citizenship & Nationality, INT’L JUST.
RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/thematic-research-guides/nationality-citizenship/ (last visited Feb.
16, 2018) [hereinafter Citizenship & Nationality].
139
Id.
140
David Weissbrodt & Clay Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 245,
249 (2006), http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1416&context=faculty_articles.
130
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nationality should play no role.141 Regardless, stateless persons are more
vulnerable than others to the violation of their basic rights.142 Therefore,
Myanmar’s refusal to grant citizenship to the Rohingya can plausibly be
characterized as a human rights violation because the denial of citizenship
results in the denial of the rights gained from nationality.143
The right to a nationality is addressed in a number of international
instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.144 Article 24(3) states: “Every child has the right to acquire a
nationality.”145 A child’s right to a nationality is also recognized by the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child.146 Article 7 of the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child states:
The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
the right to a name, the right to acquire a nationality . . . States Parties
shall ensure implementation of these rights in accordance with their
national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless.147

Myanmar ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1991.148
Despite the international recognition of a right to a nationality, the
Myanmar government continues to deprive the Rohingya of that right.149

141

Id.
Carol A. Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status, 10 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 156, 159 (1998).
143
Id.
144
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 24(3), Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
145
Id.
146
Zawacki, supra note 67, at 19.
147
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. It is important to note
General Comment 17 to Art. 24(3) and its implications for the 1982 Citizenship Law:
142

[The provision] does not necessarily make it an obligation for States to give their
nationality to every child born in their territory. However, States are required to adopt
every appropriate measure, both internally and in cooperation with other States, to ensure
every child has a nationality when he is born. In this connection, no discrimination with
regard to the acquisition of nationality should be admissible under internal law between
legitimate children and children born out of wedlock or stateless parents or based on the
nationality status of one or both of the parents.
See SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 725 (3d. ed. 2013).
148
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 71.
149
Burma: Amend Biased Citizenship Law, HRW (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/
13/burma-amend-biased-citizenship-law
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Individuals, including children, who lack a nationality or an effective
citizenship are “among the world’s most vulnerable to human rights
violations.”150 Accordingly, the UNHCR has noted that “stateless persons often
live in precarious situations on the margin of society, frequently lacking
identity documentation, and subject to discrimination.”151 That has been the
case in Myanmar.152
The Rohingya face restrictions set by the Myanmar government on
movement, marriage, employment, health care, and education.153 For example,
the government reserves secondary education for citizens only, which means
the vast majority of Rohingya do not have access to state-run schools beyond
primary education.154 Similarly, they are unable to obtain most civil service
positions.155
Because the Rohingya are stateless, they are viewed as foreigners and are
under the jurisdiction of the 1864 Foreigners Act.156 If the Rohingya wish to
travel outside their village or township, they are required to seek and pay for
official permission through a license.157 These restrictions have tightened and
permission is rarely given, so many Rohingya are virtually confined to their
villages and townships and are unable to access medical services and
employment.158 Further, they are unable to conduct business between villages
and townships, which has resulted in situations of extreme poverty.159
The Rohingya have also faced issues with forced labor, land confiscation,
forced eviction, and destruction of houses.160 These “restrictions and
conditions are not limited to the Rohingya, but they have not been imposed in
the same manner or to the same degree on Buddhists or other Muslims in

150
151

Citizenship & Nationality, supra note 138.
UNHCR, A YEAR IN CRISIS: GLOBAL TRENDS 2011 1, 29 (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.

html.
152

See generally CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19.
Zawacki, supra note 67, at 19.
154
RIANNE TEN VEEN, ISLAMIC HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MYANMAR’S MUSLIMS: THE OPPRESSED OF
THE OPPRESSED 9 (2005), http://www.ihrc.org.uk/file/05OCTMyanmarPRoof.pdf.
155
Id.
156
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 99.
157
TEN VEEN, supra note 154. The procedure to obtain a license can take up to two months with no
guarantee of a positive outcome. See also CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at
99. It seems practically impossible to secure a license unless the individual is willing to pay a large sum of
money. Id.
158
TEN VEEN, supra note 154.
159
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 99.
160
Zawacki, supra note 67, at 19; see also supra Part I(B)(3).
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Rakhine State, or on other ethnic minorities across the county.”161 Since 1990,
the Myamnar government has constructed over forty model villages162 in the
North Arakan Townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Ruthidaung—the
cities where most Rohingya are located.163 To construct these model villages,
the Myanmar government often forcibly employed the Rohingya.164
Additionally, the increased militarization of northern Rakhine State since 1994
has “resulted in significant land confiscations deemed necessary for the
construction and upkeep of the border security force, or NaSaKa,165 and the
army.”166 As was the case with model villages, the Myanmar government also
forcibly employed the Rohingya to construct military installations.167 Thus has
been the “enduring nature of Rohingya statelessness.”168
II. IS CITIZENSHIP THE ANSWER?
A. Calls for the Conferral of Citizenship upon the Rohingya
The international community, in response to the stateless status of the
Rohingya and the ongoing campaigns of violence and ensuing refugee crisis,
has pushed Myanmar to amend the 1982 Citizenship Law and grant citizenship
to the Rohingya. In 2014, the U.N. General Assembly expressed serious
concern about Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya and passed a resolution
urging Myanmar to grant citizenship and equal rights to the minority.169
Similarly, the United States rebuffed the resettlement of the Rohingya stranded
on boats in a third country as a solution to the problem, instead saying that the
solution is citizenship for the Rohingya in Rakhine State.170 Countless legal

161

Id.
See supra Part I(B)(3).
163
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 100.
164
Id.
165
NaSaKa is the abbreviated term for the Nay-Sat Kut-Kwey Ye, the border security force. Its purpose
was to secure Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh and quell a Rohingya insurgency movement in the early
1990s. See Katherine G. Southwick, Myanmar’s Democratic Transition: Peril or Promise for the Stateless
Rohingya?, 19 TILBURG L. R. 261, 265 (2014).
166
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 101.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 93.
169
Special Rapporteur, General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, U.N. DOC
A/RES/68/242 (Dec. 27, 2013); UN Urges Myanmar to Give Rohingya “Full Citizenship,” VOA NEWS (Dec.
30, 2014), http://www.voanews.com/a/un-urges-myanmar-to-give-rohingya-full-citizenship/2578599.html.
170
U.S. Official Urges Myanmar to Give Citizenship to Rohingya, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-official-urges-myanmar-to-give-citizenship-to-rohingya-1433160297.
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scholars, journalists, and human rights advocates have also made similar
requests to the Myanmar government.171
B. A Viable Solution?
Despite the international recognition of a right to a nationality and the
international community’s call for the conferral of citizenship upon the
Rohingya, the Myanmar authorities maintain it is within their national
sovereignty to determine how citizenship is granted.172 Further, they claim
there are no discriminatory features of the law; rather, the Rohingya simply do
not conform to the provisions of naturalized citizenship because they cannot
provide “strong and conclusive” evidence of their status.173 The question about
the historical presence of Muslims in Arakan has “produced two diametrically
opposed versions of the region’s history.”174 Many Rohingya assert they
deserve indigenous status and, therefore, full citizenship because they have
been in the region for centuries.175 The majority of Burmese society, from the
masses to the elite,176 wholeheartedly disagrees and believes they are “illegal
Bengalis.”177 For example, former President Thein Sein has said, “There are no
Rohingya among the races. We only have Bengalis who were brought for
farming.”178 Even the current de facto leader of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi,
has contributed to maintaining the status quo by declining to use the term
“Rohingya” to describe the repressed minority.179
Despite the fervent beliefs in the opposing versions, what is evident is that
“the whole crisis is overshadowed by a complete absence of reliable
171
For legal scholars, see Zawacki, supra note 67, at 19. For journalists, see Peter Popham, Burma Will
Regret Shutting Its Eyes to the Fate of the Rohingya Boat People, INDEPENDENT (May 29, 2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/burma-will-regret-shutting-its-eyes-to-the-fate-of-therohingya-boat-people-10285673.html.
172
U Nyi Nyi, supra note 123.
173
Id.
174
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 23.
175
Cunningham, supra note 24.
176
Anne Gearan, Burma’s Thein Sein Says Military ‘Will Always Have a Special Place’ in Government,
WASH. POST (May 19, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/burmas-thein-seinsays-military-will-always-have-a-special-place-in-government/2013/05/19/253c300e-c0d4-11e2-8bd82788030e6b44_story.html.
177
See CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 96. This assertion is often
accompanied by racial commentary. For example, Ye Myint Aung of the Myanmar Consulate responded to
international outcry over Rohingya boat people by saying, “In reality, Rohingya are neither ‘Myanmar People’
nor Myanmar’s ethnic group. You will see in the photos that their complexion is ‘dark brown.’ The
complexion of Myanmar people is fair and soft, good looking as well.” Id.
178
Gearan, supra note 176.
179
Paddock, supra note 13.
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anthropological or social field research, which means that different sides
continue to circulate—or even invent—very different versions of the same
people’s histories.”180 Clearly, an “answer” to the question of the Rohingya’s
identity, including whether the term itself is proper or not, will not provide an
actual viable solution to the plight of nearly one million stateless people,
hundreds of thousands of whom live in dire conditions in squalid camps.
Neither will a possible amendment of the 1982 Citizenship Law to relax its
requirements for each of the classes of citizenship. Although it is an appealing
solution to the international community, purely formal solutions might reduce
the number of stateless persons but not the number of unprotected persons.181
It is highly unlikely that there will be an automatic end to the rampant racist
and Islamophobic discrimination the Rohingya face182 simply because they
receive naturalized citizenship. The grant of citizenship, without additional
mechanisms to address the underlying attitudes about the Rohingya, “might
lead to a shifting from statelessness ‘de jure’ to statelessness ‘de facto.’”183
This is evidenced by the experience of the Kaman—a Muslim group that lives
in southern Rakhine State and is legally recognized as a national ethnic
group.184 Most Kaman are full citizens but still face discrimination.185 For
example, members of the Kaman minority are referred to as Kular (darkskinned), a slur often used to describe the Rohingya.186 Further, the Kaman
community also faces violence from the Buddhist majority.187 It is to the
advantage of the communities involved and the international community as a
whole that nationality is not given in name only but is also effective.188

180
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 97 (quoting M. Smith, The
Muslim “Rohingyas” of Burma, 2 Paper delivered at Conference of Burma Centrum Nederland (Dec. 11,
1995)).
181
Batchelor, supra note 142, at 177.
182
See generally CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19.
183
Id. A de facto stateless person is generally defined as “a person unable to demonstrate that he/she is
de jure stateless, yet he/she has no effective nationality and does not enjoy national protection.” See
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III. A MODEL OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FIT FOR MYANMAR’S
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
While citizenship may be an internationally desired ultimate aim, a more
realistic proximate aim should be the establishment of a mechanism to address
the majority Rakhine Buddhists’ underlying fears of the Rohingya and their
potential status as citizens, which have fueled the ethnic, racial, and religious
discrimination they have faced.189 The situation of the Rohingya has become
an explosive political topic, implicating issues about national sovereignty,
Buddhist nationalism, the fear of the spread of Islam and Islamic terrorism,190
and the treatment of minorities within a minority state.191 These fears would
not necessarily be addressed by an amendment to the 1982 Citizenship Law,
which is unlikely in the current climate. Myanmar’s political transition can
provide an opportunity for the implementation of appropriate models of
transitional justice to address the underlying issues that have led to the periodic
violence seen in Rakhine State.
According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, transitional
justice refers to the mechanisms that countries—particularly those emerging
from periods of conflict and repression—can use to address large scale or
systematic human rights violations.192 Although the aims of transitional justice
vary according to the context, certain features are constant: “[T]he recognition
of the dignity of individuals, the redress and acknowledgement of violations,
and the aim to prevent such violations from happening again.”193 An actual
“transition” is not required to implement a transitional justice approach, so
long as there is an opportunity to address massive violations.194 An example of
such an opportunity is when a new government replaces a repressive one; the
new regime can introduce and support “different kinds of justice policies for

189

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN WESTERN BURMA, supra note 19, at 98.
Kyaw Ye Lynn, Myanmar Nationalists Say UN Rakhine Probe Unwelcome, ANDALOU AGENCY
(June 11, 2016), http://aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/myanmar-nationalists-say-un-rakhine-probe-unwelcome/6797
63.
191
Cunningham, supra note 24.
192
What is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, https://www.ictj.org/about/
transitional-justice (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). The United Nations defines transitional justice as the full range
of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation. See U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice 3 (Mar.
2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf. [hereinafter United
Nations Approach to Transitional Justice].
193
What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 192.
194
Id.
190

HOQUE GALLEYPROOFS

572

5/15/2018 12:37 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

past atrocities”—as has been the case in Argentina, South Africa, Peru, and
Tunisia, among others.195
Aung San Suu Kyi’s new government provides an opportunity for both the
national government and regional authorities in Myanmar to address the
massive human rights violations the Rohingya have faced and continue to face.
Prior to the majority victory of the National League for Democracy in
November 2015, advocates of transitional justice recognized the value the
approach could have if certain critical developments took place in Myanmar—
namely peace, a new government, and constitutional reform.196 While all of
those developments have not yet been met, the shift from a former military
regime to a new democratic government increases the potential value and
success of the implementation of certain approaches to transitional justice.
In general, there are four approaches to transitional justice: criminal
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and institutional
reform.197 In Myanmar and, in particular, Rakhine State, truth commissions
and institutional reform seem to be the appropriate initial methods of
transitional justice. Reparations programs aim to compensate victims of
systemic violations of human rights by providing them with an assortment of
material and symbolic benefits.198 They can be better implemented following
truth commissions once the community has “processed which groups have
been victimized and why.”199 In Myanmar, criminal prosecutions may not be
likely tools during the current democratic transition because, generally, “states
emerging from years of conflict or repressive rule may be unable or unwilling”
to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions of members of the former
regime.200
A. Truth Commission
Truth commissions are “non-judicial or quasi-judicial investigative bodies,
which map patterns of past violence, and unearth the causes and
consequences.”201 The core activities usually include collecting statements
from victims and witnesses, conducting thematic research, organizing public
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hearings and other awareness programs, and publishing a final report outlining
findings and recommendations.202
1. Past and Present Commissions in Rakhine State
In the past, Myanmar has established commissions in Rakhine State
somewhat similar to the truth commissions identified above in order to
understand communal violence and to find a solution for peace. In 2012, the
national government formed the Rakhine Inquiry Commission.203 Its purpose
was to “discover root causes of communal violence and provide
recommendations for the prevention of recurrence of violence in the future and
promotion of peaceful coexistence.”204 After conducting its investigation and
analysis, the Commission concluded that the review of the Rohingyas’
citizenship was a priority and the government should not only apply existing
national laws, but also adhere to international agreements, among other
things.205 However, the Commission was criticized for not including a
Rohingya representative and for using “Bengali” to refer to the Rohingya
community.206 In fact, the Commission included a section in its report on why
the term Rohingya is not accepted, pointing to the belief that the term is a
recent invention and the minority population must be identified, above all, as
Muslim.207
In addition to the Rakhine Inquiry Commission, former U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan was tasked with leading the Advisory Commission on
Rakhine State, which was formed in August 2016.208 The Advisory
Commission released its Final Report in August 2017,209 just hours before the
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s attack and the Myanmar military’s

202
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REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, FINAL REPORT OF INQUIRY COMMISSION ON SECTARIAN
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HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/aung-san-suu-kyi-united-nationsrohingya_us_57e2e2b7e4b08d73b82f355f.
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disproportionate response in northern Rakhine State.210 Immediately, the Final
Report addressed the issue with the term Rohingya, noting its use of “Muslim”
to identify them over “Bengali” or “Rohingya” in order to keep in line with the
request of the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi.211 After providing a
historical overview of anti-central government and intercommunal tensions in
Rakhine State, the Final Report listed the Advisory Commission’s main
findings and recommendations in a number of areas.212 Notably, the Advisory
Commission did not directly advocate granting the Rohingya citizenship but
did recommend that the Myanmar government “set in motion a process to
review the law,” which should “re-examine the current linkage between
citizenship and ethnicity.”213
Despite its review of and recommendations for the human rights issues that
the Rohingya face, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State has faced
criticism similar to the Rakhine Inquiry Commission.214 Primarily, the
Advisory Commission on Rakhine State contained a panel of six members
from Myanmar and three members from overseas but not a single Rohingya.215
Another criticism is that the Advisory Commission’s mandate focuses broadly
on development instead of taking an investigative approach to human rights
violations.216
2. Goals of the Truth Commission
In the implementation of a truth commission, Myanmar’s new government
should aim to learn from the criticisms of previous commissions. The
effectiveness of a truth commission is dependent upon two crucial factors: (1)
“whether the commission is able to attract the attention of its constituents,” and
210

MY WORLD IS FINISHED, supra note 10, at 6.
FINAL ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 209, at 12. Interestingly, another Muslim group,
the Kaman, are referred to as “Kaman” and not “Muslims,” highlighting the tension with the ethnic
identification of “Rohingya.” Id.
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movement; internally displaced persons (IDPs); humanitarian access; media access; education; health; drugs;
communal participation and representation; intercommunal cohesion; the security sector; access to justice;
cultural development; border issues and the bilateral relationship with Bangladesh; and regional relations. Id.
at 5.
213
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reside in Myanmar without being citizens, . . . should clarify residency rights, and provide associated
documentation.” Id. at 28.
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Mike Ives, Kofi Annan, in Myanmar, Voices Concerns Over Reported Abuses of Rohingya, N.Y.
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(2) “whether the commission is perceived as legitimate among members of the
mass public.”217 In achieving both of these aims, the truth commission should
be based on national consultation, which the United Nations asserts is a critical
element of a human rights-based approach to transitional justice.218 An
essential aspect of national consultation is public participation.219 Effective
outreach must address both specific groups affected by the particular
mechanisms involved as well as the broader community.220 Accordingly, the
truth commission should aim to include as many members of different ethnic
groups as possible—in contrast to the Rakhine Inquiry Commission and the
Advisory Commission on Rakhine State.
In fact, the findings in the Rakhine Inquiry Commission’s Final Report
highlight the importance of public participation. According to this report,
amongst the total 1,200 survey respondents, only twenty-five percent of the
600 Rakhine from northern Rakhine State reported having Bengali221
acquaintances—but only for business dealings.222 Similarly, the Bengalis
living in the same region said that apart from the work sphere, they did not mix
at all with the Rakhine in social, family, or leisure matters.223 The Rakhine
Inquiry Commission also conducted a similar survey in southern Rakhine
State, where there was more contact between the Rakhine and Rohingya and,
therefore, less harsh words exchanged about either ethnic group.224 The
Commission concluded: “The lack of contact between the Rakhine and the
Bengalis in the north seems to have contributed to a lack of understanding
between the two sides.”225 Crucial contact between the Rakhine and
Rohingya—although obvious but still not officially and formally
implemented—must be a major component of the truth commission.
Moreover, the national consultation process helps victims and other
members of civil society develop local ownership of the resulting program.226
This is necessary because there are “concerns that international attention

217
James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, 72 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 123, 126 (2009).
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United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, supra note 192.
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directed at the Rohingya situation, meant to hold the government accountable,
may have inadvertently played a role in exacerbating tensions between the
Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists.”227 For example, there were large
demonstrations in Sittwe by Rakhine Buddhists protesting international
misrepresentation of the local situation following the May 2015 humanitarian
crisis.228 There have been many similar protests aimed at the international
community—from media to international non-governmental organizations—
often leading to increased violence and lack of access to international
humanitarian aid in their aftermath.229 The Advisory Commission on Rakhine
State, with a former U.N. Secretary-General in charge and the inclusion of
foreign panelists,230 may continue to increase anti-international hostility. A
truth commission led by local leaders from all ethnic groups and based on
public participation of all voices in the community will allow the Rohingya
and Rakhine Buddhists to voice their concerns about issues that ultimately
affect them the most.
Local ownership of the truth commission is particularly important in the
context of the debate over the term “Rohingya.” The debate, especially in the
international community, has been elevated as a focal point of the
humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State, with most observers in favor of using the
term “Rohingya.”231 As a result, Rakhine Buddhists, as well as other groups in
Myanmar, feel misunderstood and besieged because they believe “the
international community’s use of the term ‘Rohingya’ validates the narrative of
‘essentializing’ a Muslim identity in Rakhine State.”232 There is widespread
fear of a Muslim identity in Rakhine State, and anti-Muslim propaganda is
frequently voiced in the national discourse.233 In a survey of 500 participants
across seven cities in Myanmar, “85 percent cited fears of the country turning
Islamic as the main reason for their dislike of Muslims.”234 These fears

227
Jasmine Chia, The Truth About Myanmar’s Rohingya Issue, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 5, 2016),
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culminate in the term “Rohingya,” which the Rakhine Inquiry Commission’s
Final Report shows is divisive to the point of violence:
Should the Bengalis continue to insist they should be called
Rohingya, the majority in the country will not accept this and there
could be further unrest. The indigenous Rakhine can be expected to
have an intense reaction. Thus, Bengalis now pushing to use the term
Rohingya are surely fanning the flames of sectarian violence.235

Although the Final Report blames advocacy for the use of the term
“Rohingya,” in reality it is a complicated mix of fear and discrimination
against Muslims in Rakhine State that is a major cause of the periodic
communal violence in the region.236
A primary function of the truth commission must be the appropriate
investigation of those instances of violence. There may never be a definitive
answer to the so-called “Rohingya” question.237 People who self-identify as
Rohingya will continue to do so, while the majority who believe the term is a
recent invention having no place in Myanmar will continue to push their
stance. Instead, both communities must confront the reality of, as well as their
responsibility for, the violence they periodically face. The previous
commissions were not mandated to address the specific instances of violence
that have been thoroughly documented by news media outlets and human
rights groups, and instead opted to broadly condemn the violence in general.238
Without specifically addressing the violence by insurgent groups, vigilantes,
and the Myanmar military in Rakhine State, the truth commission will fail in
its most important task: To establish the truth and formally recognize the
crimes and abuses that victims have endured.239
The tools a truth commission can use in its realization of this goal include
public and private testimony from victims, witnesses, and experts.240
Additionally, the panelists of the commission should issue a comprehensive
report of their findings to serve as a record of the truth. The report should also
235
The Final Report further states, “Whilst there are, at present, some issues that can be resolved through
peaceful debate and negotiation, Bengali demands to be recognized as Rohingya will only be divisive, leading
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1995)).
238
See FINAL ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 209, at 13.
239
Truth Commissions, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJGlobal-Truth-Commissions-2008-English.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Truth Commissions].
240
Id.

HOQUE GALLEYPROOFS

578

5/15/2018 12:37 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

contain recommendations for use by the local Rakhine State government and
the national government.241 An ultimate aim of the truth commission is to
contribute to the development of a rule-of-law culture that respects human
rights and thereby raises the costs of future efforts to violate the human rights
of the citizenry.242 Achieving this aim is more likely when the truth
commission includes comprehensive policies to hold perpetrators accountable,
paving the way for systemic reform.243
3. Likelihood of the Implementation of a Truth Commission
It is important to consider the likelihood of the Myanmar government’s
implementation of a truth commission. The Advisory Commission on Rakhine
State was already seen as an effort to assess the situation in Rakhine State.244
Furthermore, according to the International Center for Transitional Justice, it
appears that Aung San Suu Kyi and her party do not believe transitional justice
is necessary or desirable.245 From public comments and other reported
discussions, it seems that Aung San Suu Kyi and other National League for
Democracy leaders associate transitional justice with criminal prosecutions
motivated by revenge.246 It is possible that leaders in Rakhine State, most of
whom are Rakhine Buddhists, may hold similar views and be opposed to a
truth commission, particularly one that includes Rohingya voices.
B. Institutional Reform
In addition to a truth commission, Myanmar’s democratic transition
provides an opportunity for institutional reform. Public institutions that helped
to maintain and spread conflict or repressive rule “must be transformed into
fair and efficient institutions that protect human rights and foster a culture of
respect for the rule of law.”247 The source of much of the systematic violence
against the Rohingya in Rakhine State is Myanmar’s military forces.248 There
has been a start to institutional reform of the military forces. In August 2016,
the deputy commander Lt. Gen. Mya Tun Oo of Myanmar Army’s North
Eastern Command publicly admitted that soldiers under his command killed
241
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five local men during an interrogation in northern Shan State.249 There was a
court martial with family members of the deceased present, during which
soldiers confessed to the crime.250
Holding the military officers accountable for their illegal actions
complements the investigative functions of the truth commission251 and is a
crucial step to reigning in the violence and instability in Rakhine State.
Institutional reform should “incorporate comprehensive training programs for
public officials and employees on applicable human rights standards,” in order
to prevent the recurrence of future human rights violations.252 However, the
position of the Myanmar military as former rulers and their continuing
domination challenges institutional reform, as highlighted by the violent
military crackdown in Rakhine State in August 2017 and Aung San Suu Kyi’s
persistent refusal to acknowledge or condemn the military’s role.253
CONCLUSION
The persecution of the Rohingya began with the former military regime,
whose forces continue to dominate Rakhine State and are primarily responsible
for the extreme violence and mass exodus of the Rohingya to neighboring
Bangladesh in mid- to late-2017.254 Although Myanmar’s military retains a
powerful place in the country’s government, Myanmar is undoubtedly
undergoing a significant transition into democracy—most notably due to its
first freely elected parliament and Aung San Suu Kyi’s de facto leadership.
While the combination of old and new regimes has created a complex reality255
that imposes great challenges in addressing and alleviating the plight of the
Rohingya, it also provides an opportunity for the implementation of
transitional justice mechanisms—namely, a truth commission and institutional
reform—to address massive human rights violations the Rohingya have faced
in the past and continue to presently face.
However, implementing a truth commission and institutional reform does
not guarantee societal transformation.256 Although the goal is the advancement
249
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of political tolerance—a central component of democratic political culture and
a necessary ingredient for coexistence—some view transitional justice as the
product of social change rather than the cause of it.257 The revelation of the
“truth” is not the only factor that will lead to change in the socio-economic
conditions many Rohingya face, in part due to their lack of citizenship. While
establishing a truth commission and institutional reform may ease the
transition into some kind of citizenship for the Rohingya,258 actual change in
their legal citizenship status and quality of life would require a larger shift in
attitude and action from the Myanmar government. The democratic transition
the country is undergoing—and the opportunities for transitional justice it
provides—will hopefully serve as the desperately needed spark for that shift.
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